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Feeling	  bad	  and	  seeing	  bad	  MICHAEL	  S.	  BRADY1	  	  
ABSTRACT	  	  The	  emotions	  of	  guilt,	  shame,	  disappointment,	  and	  grief,	  and	  the	  bodily	  states	  of	  pain	  and	  suffering,	  have	  something	  in	  common,	  at	  least	  phenomenologically:	  they	  are	  all	  unpleasant,	  they	  feel	  bad.	  But	  how	  might	  we	  explain	  what	  it	  is	  for	  some	  state	  to	  feel	  bad	  or	  unpleasant?	  What,	  in	  other	  words,	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  
negative	  affect?	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  want	  to	  consider	  the	  prospects	  for	  evaluativist	  theories,	  which	  seek	  to	  explain	  unpleasantness	  by	  appeal	  to	  negative	  evaluations	  or	  appraisals.	  In	  particular,	  I	  want	  to	  consider	  versions	  of	  evaluativism	  which	  seek	  to	  explain	  negative	  affect	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  negative	  perceptual	  experience.	  These	  views	  thus	  attempt	  to	  explain	  feeling	  bad	  in	  terms	  of	  seeing	  
bad.	  Now	  the	  most	  prominent	  evaluativist	  accounts	  of	  negative	  affect	  have	  been	  developed	  in	  the	  pain	  literature,	  and	  so	  my	  paper	  will	  primarily	  be	  focused	  on	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  evaluativism	  can	  provide	  a	  plausible	  account	  of	  the	  painfulness	  or	  unpleasantness	  of	  pain.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  evaluativism	  faces	  serious	  objections	  on	  this	  score.	  Since	  my	  conclusions	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  cover	  negative	  affect	  more	  generally,	  however,	  we	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  reject	  evaluativist	  accounts	  of	  the	  negative	  affect	  involved	  in	  emotional	  experience.	  My	  arguments	  will	  thus	  have	  implications	  for	  those	  interested	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  emotional	  valence.	  I’ll	  conclude	  with	  some	  brief	  remarks	  about	  the	  shape	  that	  a	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‘relational’	  account	  of	  painfulness	  in	  particular,	  and	  of	  negative	  affect	  in	  general,	  should	  take,	  in	  light	  of	  these	  criticisms	  of	  evaluativism.	  In	  my	  view,	  such	  views	  should	  appeal,	  not	  to	  negative	  evaluations	  to	  explain	  feeling	  bad,	  but	  to	  dislike.	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Feeling	  bad	  and	  seeing	  bad	  
	  Pain,	  suffering,	  and	  negative	  emotions	  have	  an	  hedonic	  or	  feeling	  element.	  In	  general,	  this	  element	  is	  one	  of	  unpleasantness;	  in	  the	  case	  of	  pain,	  the	  element	  is	  one	  of	  painfulness.	  But	  in	  what	  does	  painfulness	  consist?	  Evaluativists	  want	  to	  answer	  this	  by	  appeal	  to	  evaluation	  or	  appraisal.	  Thus,	  as	  Brian	  Cutter	  and	  Michael	  Tye	  put	  it,	  “our	  pain	  experiences	  do	  not	  just	  represent	  the	  presence	  of	  tissue	  damage,	  but	  also	  (roughly)	  represent	  our	  tissue	  damage	  as	  being	  bad	  for	  us	  to	  some	  degree.”	  (Cutter	  &	  Tye	  2011,	  p.	  91.)	  On	  this	  view,	  pain	  would	  seem	  to	  consist	  of	  two	  elements	  or	  components.	  The	  first,	  phenomenal	  state	  is	  usually	  identified	  with	  a	  sensation.	  On	  some	  accounts,	  this	  is	  held	  to	  be	  a	  ‘somatosensory	  perceptual	  experience’	  that	  has	  representational	  content.	  In	  particular,	  the	  sensation	  represents	  some	  kind	  of	  bodily	  disturbance	  or	  disorder,	  malfunction	  or	  damage.	  The	  second	  element	  is	  an	  evaluation	  or	  appraisal	  of	  this	  disturbance,	  disorder,	  or	  damage.	  	  Evaluativists	  differ	  over	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  appraising	  state.	  One	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  evaluation	  consists	  of	  a	  judgement	  that	  the	  sensation	  (or	  bodily	  damage)	  is	  harmful	  to	  the	  subject;	  Norton	  Nelkin	  takes	  this	  line.	  (Nelkin	  1994,	  p.	  332.)	  However,	  it	  is	  increasingly	  common,	  and	  rather	  more	  plausible,	  to	  think	  of	  the	  appraisal	  as	  itself	  a	  kind	  of	  (affective)	  perceptual	  experience.	  Painful	  experiences	  are	  thus	  held	  to	  involve	  two	  kinds	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  –	  one	  which	  informs	  us	  of	  some	  bodily	  disturbance,	  and	  the	  other	  which	  informs	  us	  of	  the	  badness	  of	  the	  first	  somatosensory	  perceptual	  experience	  or	  the	  badness	  of	  the	  bodily	  disturbance.	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It	  might	  be	  helpful	  to	  have	  a	  couple	  of	  illustrations	  of	  what	  evaluativists	  say.	  So	  consider,	  first,	  Bennett	  Helm,	  who	  thinks	  that	  painful	  experiences	  are	  felt	  
evaluations	  and	  which	  are	  a	  form	  of	  emotional	  response,	  akin	  to	  a	  perceptual	  experience.	  (Helm,	  2002)	  On	  his	  view,	  felt	  evaluations	  are	  “feelings	  of	  negative	  import”,	  feelings	  in	  which	  the	  badness	  of	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  one’s	  body	  impresses	  itself	  upon	  us,	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  colours	  impress	  themselves	  on	  us	  in	  perceptual	  experience.	  Unlike	  perceptions,	  however,	  the	  felt	  evaluations	  constitutive	  of	  pain	  hold	  our	  attention	  and	  motivate	  us	  to	  act.	  Note	  that	  the	  relevant	  feelings	  are	  distinct	  from	  the	  feelings	  of	  bodily	  changes	  that	  William	  James	  identified	  with	  emotions.	  Helm	  thinks	  that	  these	  are	  not	  necessary	  to	  emotional	  experience.	  Instead,	  the	  relevant	  feelings	  just	  are	  the	  feelings	  of	  attentional	  focus	  and	  urge	  to	  act.2	  Consider,	  next,	  David	  Bain,	  who	  maintains	  that	  the	  state	  of	  appraisal	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  a	  perceptual	  experience.	  (Bain,	  2013)	  On	  Bain’s	  view,	  “a	  subject’s	  being	  in	  unpleasant	  pain	  consists	  in	  his	  (i)	  undergoing	  an	  experience	  (the	  pain)	  that	  represents	  a	  disturbance	  of	  a	  certain	  sort,	  and	  (ii)	  that	  same	  experience	  additionally	  representing	  the	  disturbance	  as	  bad	  for	  him	  in	  a	  bodily	  sense.”	  (p.	  82)	  Unpleasant	  pain	  thus	  involves	  two	  representations,	  each	  of	  which	  is	  a	  form	  of	  perceptual	  experience.	  As	  with	  other	  versions	  of	  evaluativism,	  Bain	  thinks	  that	  the	  element	  of	  appraisal	  is	  essential	  if	  we	  are	  to	  explain	  why	  pain	  feels	  bad.	  He	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  Helm	  writes:	  “to	  feel	  fear	  is	  to	  be	  pained	  by	  danger,	  this	  distinctive	  kind	  of	  import,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  danger	  impresses	  itself	  on	  one,	  grabbing	  one’s	  attention	  and	  priming	  one	  to	  act;	  the	  emotional	  response,	  the	  feeling	  of	  this	  danger,	  just	  is	  the	  pain.”	  (p.	  19)	  And:	  “Emotions	  are	  pleasures	  and	  pains	  not	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  somehow	  involve	  certain	  bodily	  sensations	  as	  a	  conceptually	  separable	  component	  but	  rather	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  essentially	  are	  a	  distinctive	  kind	  of	  evaluation,	  now	  revealed	  to	  be	  felt	  evaluations.	  Consequently,	  their	  phenomenology	  should	  be	  understood	  accordingly:	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  feel	  emotional	  pleasure	  or	  pain	  is	  to	  have	  one’s	  attention	  gripped	  by	  the	  goodness	  or	  badness	  of	  something	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  one	  thereby	  feels	  the	  pull	  to	  act	  appropriately.”	  (pp.	  19-­‐20)	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writes:	  “the	  pain	  is	  unpleasant…only	  because	  it	  further	  represents	  that	  bodily	  disturbance	  as	  bad	  for	  you.	  If,	  stepping	  into	  [hot	  bath]	  water,	  an	  asymbolic	  has	  a	  pain	  that	  is	  not	  unpleasant,	  that	  is	  because,	  even	  though	  the	  represented	  disturbance	  is	  bad	  for	  him,	  his	  pain	  fails	  to	  represent	  it	  as	  such;	  his	  pain	  lacks	  that	  layer	  of	  evaluative	  content.”	  (Ibid.)	  	  Evaluativism	  therefore	  comes	  in	  different	  shapes	  and	  sizes.	  But	  why	  think	  any	  of	  these	  views	  plausible?	  One	  argument	  is	  that	  evaluativism	  fares	  better	  than	  rival	  accounts	  in	  capturing	  the	  normative	  and	  motivational	  properties	  that	  painfulness	  has.	  This	  is	  Bain’s	  strategy	  in	  his	  2013	  paper.	  A	  more	  direct	  route	  is	  to	  highlight	  the	  close	  connections	  between	  painfulness	  and	  negative	  evaluation,	  and	  suggest	  that	  the	  simplest	  way	  to	  accommodate	  this	  connection	  is	  to	  hold	  that	  painfulness	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  or	  is	  constituted	  by	  negative	  evaluation.	  Helm	  at	  times	  seems	  to	  take	  this	  route.	  He	  writes	  that	  “it	  is	  uncontroversial	  that	  pleasures	  and	  pains	  have	  a	  particular	  feel	  to	  them,	  that	  they	  motivate	  us	  to	  act,	  and	  that	  we	  generally	  have	  positive	  attitudes	  towards	  pleasures	  or	  things	  that	  please	  us	  (they	  feel	  good)	  and	  negative	  attitudes	  towards	  pains	  or	  things	  that	  hurt	  us	  (they	  feel	  bad).”	  (Helm	  2002,	  p.	  13)	  Here	  the	  negative	  attitude	  is	  identified	  with	  feeling	  bad.	  Something	  similar	  occurs	  later	  in	  the	  paper,	  where	  Helm	  states	  that	  “Bodily	  pleasures	  and	  pains	  are	  evaluative:	  in	  feeling	  them,	  we	  feel	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  a	  particular	  body	  part	  to	  be	  good	  or	  bad.	  Indeed,	  for	  such	  an	  evaluation	  to	  be	  missing	  in	  a	  bodily	  sensation	  is,	  under	  normal	  circumstances,	  for	  that	  sensation	  not	  to	  be	  a	  pleasure	  or	  pain	  at	  all.”	  (p.	  22)	  We’ll	  see	  later	  whether	  evaluativism	  does	  in	  fact	  succeed	  in	  capturing	  the	  normativity	  of	  pain;	  I	  have	  my	  doubts.	  We	  can	  note	  now,	  however,	  that	  accepting	  a	  close	  connection	  between	  painfulness	  and	  negative	  evaluation	  clearly	  does	  not	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force	  us	  to	  identify	  painfulness	  with	  the	  negative	  evaluation	  –	  any	  more	  than	  the	  close	  connection	  between	  painfulness	  and	  desire	  forces	  us	  to	  identify	  these	  two	  things.	  Nevertheless,	  even	  if	  there	  are	  (more)	  compelling	  reasons	  to	  take	  evaluativism	  seriously,	  the	  theory	  won’t	  be	  acceptable	  unless	  it	  can	  manage	  to	  address	  certain	  difficulties.	  It	  is	  to	  these	  that	  I	  now	  turn.	  	   2.	  	  I	  want	  to	  begin	  by	  considering	  the	  standard	  form	  of	  evaluativism	  favoured	  by	  Bain,	  Helm,	  and	  Tye,	  and	  which	  maintains	  that	  the	  negative	  evaluation	  is	  of	  the	  bodily	  disturbance,	  rather	  than	  of	  the	  sensation	  that	  represents	  this	  disturbance.	  I’ll	  consider	  the	  prospects	  for	  another,	  non-­‐standard	  form	  of	  evaluativism	  in	  §3.	  The	  first	  form	  of	  evaluativism	  faces	  a	  serious	  objection,	  one	  which	  was	  originally	  raised	  by	  Richard	  Hall,	  and	  which	  Bain	  considers	  in	  response	  to	  his	  own	  evaluativist	  proposal.	  (Hall	  1989,	  p.	  647)	  This	  is	  the	  ‘messenger-­‐shooting	  objection.’	  (Bain	  2013,	  p.	  86)	  The	  worry	  is	  that	  evaluativism	  of	  this	  stripe	  seems	  to	  leave	  an	  explanatory	  gap.	  For	  what	  we	  want	  to	  explain	  is	  the	  painfulness,	  and	  hence	  the	  badness,	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  pain.	  Evaluativism	  tries	  to	  capture	  this	  in	  virtue	  of	  a	  representation	  of	  some	  bodily	  condition	  as	  bad.	  But	  how	  can	  a	  representation	  of	  the	  badness	  of	  some	  bodily	  condition	  help	  us	  to	  explain	  the	  badness	  of	  the	  experience?	  Bodily	  conditions	  and	  experiences	  of	  those	  conditions	  are,	  after	  all,	  two	  different	  things;	  as	  a	  result,	  it	  seems	  rather	  puzzling	  to	  see	  how	  the	  badness	  of	  one	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  related	  to	  the	  badness	  of	  the	  other.	  Here	  is	  the	  challenge	  in	  Bain’s	  own	  words:	  “[H]ow	  might	  evaluativists	  explain	  why	  an	  episode	  representing	  your	  own	  body	  part	  as	  being	  in	  a	  state	  that	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is	  bad	  for	  you	  (in	  a	  bodily	  sense)	  should	  itself	  be	  bad	  for	  you	  (in	  an	  experiential	  sense)?	  What	  is	  so	  bad	  about	  being	  somatosensorily	  informed	  that	  your	  foot	  is	  in	  a	  bad	  state?	  Suppose	  you	  lack	  feet,	  and	  know	  your	  pain	  is	  a	  phantom	  limb	  experience.	  What	  is	  so	  bad	  about	  this	  experience	  informing	  you	  that	  the	  state	  of	  a	  foot	  you	  know	  you	  lack	  is	  bad	  for	  you?	  Why	  shoot	  the	  messenger	  if	  you	  know	  the	  message	  is	  false?	  Indeed,	  returning	  to	  the	  veridical	  case,	  why	  shoot	  the	  messenger	  even	  if	  you	  know	  the	  message	  is	  true?”	  (Ibid.)	  	  How	  might	  the	  evaluativist	  respond?	  Bain	  himself	  makes	  appeal	  to	  something	  that	  he	  considers	  “natural	  and	  intuitive”,	  namely	  the	  idea	  “that	  its	  seeming	  to	  you	  that	  things	  are	  bad	  for	  you	  in	  some	  way	  can	  itself	  be	  bad	  for	  you	  in	  another	  way.”	  (Ibid.)	  To	  illustrate,	  he	  draws	  an	  analogy	  with	  the	  unpleasantness	  or	  badness	  of	  negative	  emotional	  experiences	  such	  as	  grief	  or	  fear.	  Bain	  holds	  that	  to	  be	  in	  a	  state	  of	  grief	  is	  unpleasant	  or	  defeasibly	  bad;	  we	  pity	  those	  who	  grieve.	  But	  this	  is	  because	  “grief	  is	  a	  state	  in	  which	  a	  death	  strikes	  you	  as	  bad…and	  we	  recognize	  that	  something’s	  striking	  you	  that	  way	  is	  itself	  bad	  for	  you.”	  The	  general	  idea,	  then,	  is	  that	  “it	  can	  be	  intrinsically	  bad	  for	  you	  (in	  one	  sense)	  to	  be	  in	  a	  state	  in	  which	  something	  seems	  bad	  for	  you	  (in	  another	  sense).”	  (p.	  87)	  Although	  there	  is	  indeed	  something	  natural	  and	  intuitive	  about	  Bain’s	  principle,	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  appeal	  to	  this	  idea	  fails	  to	  address	  the	  messenger-­‐shooting	  objection,	  since	  there	  are	  different	  states	  in	  which	  things	  can	  seem	  bad	  to	  us,	  not	  all	  of	  which	  are	  themselves	  bad.	  If	  so,	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  remains.	  I’ll	  then	  argue	  that	  the	  distinctive	  features	  of	  felt	  evaluations	  that	  Helm	  appeals	  to	  do	  nothing	  to	  close	  this	  gap.	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Consider	  examples	  of	  different	  states	  in	  which	  things	  can	  seem	  to	  us	  to	  be	  a	  certain	  way.	  Thus,	  it	  might	  seem	  to	  me	  that	  there	  is	  an	  oasis	  in	  the	  desert	  when	  I	  believe	  that	  there	  is,	  or	  when	  I	  perceive	  that	  there	  is,	  or	  hallucinate	  one.	  Consider,	  next,	  examples	  of	  different	  states	  in	  which	  things	  can	  seem	  to	  us	  to	  be	  a	  certain	  way	  evaluatively.	  Thus,	  it	  might	  seem	  to	  me	  that	  my	  answer	  to	  the	  interviewer’s	  question	  is	  disastrous	  when	  I	  believe	  that	  it	  is,	  or	  have	  an	  intuition	  that	  it	  is,	  or	  suspect	  that	  it	  is.	  Now	  it	  is	  clearly	  not	  the	  case	  that	  all	  of	  these	  candidates	  can	  be	  the	  kind	  of	  seeming	  that	  makes	  the	  state	  intrinsically	  bad	  –	  precisely	  because	  not	  all	  of	  these	  states	  are	  ones	  that	  are	  intrinsically	  bad	  to	  be	  in,	  or	  states	  that	  make	  a	  person	  a	  suitable	  object	  of	  pity.	  For	  instance,	  believing	  that	  something	  is	  bad	  for	  you	  is	  not	  in	  itself	  a	  state	  which	  is	  bad	  for	  you.	  Suppose	  that	  I	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  raining	  and	  that	  this	  is	  bad	  for	  me	  because	  I’ll	  get	  wet.	  Surely	  this	  evaluation	  of	  my	  situation	  is	  not	  something	  that	  is	  itself	  bad	  for	  me,	  or	  something	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  I	  am	  to	  be	  pitied.3	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  believing	  that	  my	  reputation	  is	  under	  threat,	  or	  that	  the	  party	  was	  terrible,	  or	  my	  behaviour	  shameful,	  are	  not	  in	  themselves	  ways	  in	  which	  things	  seem	  bad	  to	  me	  that	  constitute	  instances	  of	  unpleasantness.	  So	  it	  doesn’t	  seem	  true	  that	  a	  state	  in	  which	  things	  doxastically	  seem	  bad	  to	  me	  is	  itself	  bad	  for	  me.	  Things	  can,	  of	  course,	  seem	  to	  us	  to	  be	  a	  certain	  way	  without	  our	  believing	  them	  to	  be	  that	  way.	  This	  is	  often	  true	  when	  our	  imagination	  has	  an	  influence	  on	  what	  we	  literally	  see:	  it	  might,	  for	  instance,	  seem	  to	  you	  that	  your	  dog	  understands	  what	  you	  are	  saying	  without	  your	  believing	  that	  he	  does;	  or	  it	  might	  seem	  to	  you	  that	  the	  duck-­‐rabbit	  figure	  is	  a	  duck	  at	  one	  time	  and	  a	  rabbit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Perhaps	  the	  belief	  can	  be	  intrinsically	  bad	  for	  me	  in	  certain	  ways	  should	  it	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  false,	  since	  there	  might	  be	  something	  intrinsically	  bad	  about	  having	  false	  beliefs.	  But	  this,	  I	  assume,	  fails	  to	  be	  a	  plausible	  explanation	  of	  the	  badness	  of	  pain.	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at	  another;	  or	  you	  might	  see	  something	  ‘as’	  or	  ‘in	  terms	  of’	  another,	  such	  as	  a	  seeing	  a	  long-­‐winded	  conference	  question	  as	  a	  piece	  of	  attention-­‐seeking.	  These	  are	  cases	  of	  mental	  states	  that	  Robert	  C.	  Roberts	  describes	  as	  ‘construals.’	  (Roberts	  2003,	  p.	  67)	  The	  idea	  that	  things	  can	  seem	  to	  us	  to	  be	  a	  certain	  way	  without	  our	  believing	  them	  to	  be	  that	  way	  is	  also	  often	  true	  of	  our	  ‘intuitive’	  responses.	  It	  might,	  for	  instance,	  seem	  to	  you	  that	  ‘transplant’	  cases	  –	  i.e.	  cases	  where	  one	  can	  save	  five	  lives	  by	  sacrificing	  a	  healthy	  individual	  and	  transplanting	  their	  organs	  to	  five	  unhealthy	  people	  who	  would	  otherwise	  die	  –	  tell	  against	  consequentialism,	  since	  consequentialism	  holds,	  counterintuitively,	  that	  it	  would	  be	  morally	  right	  to	  sacrifice	  the	  healthy	  individual	  in	  this	  case.	  But	  it	  might	  seem	  to	  you	  that	  consequentialism	  gets	  the	  wrong	  answer	  here	  without	  your	  believing	  that	  it	  does,	  because	  you	  have	  another	  secure	  belief	  that	  consequentialism	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  correct	  moral	  theory.	  In	  this	  case	  your	  moral	  intuitions,	  and	  your	  moral	  beliefs,	  are	  in	  conflict.4	  However,	  construals	  and	  intuitions	  fail	  to	  provide	  the	  right	  sort	  of	  ‘seemings’	  needed	  to	  make	  Bain’s	  version	  of	  evaluativism	  about	  the	  unpleasantness	  of	  pain	  plausible.	  I	  might	  construe	  a	  situation	  as	  one	  in	  which	  something	  bad	  is	  happening	  to	  me	  –	  as	  when	  I	  construe	  the	  student’s	  question	  as	  insulting.	  Or	  I	  might	  have	  a	  ‘philosophical’	  intuition	  that	  something	  bad	  is	  happening	  to	  me	  –	  as	  when	  I	  have	  an	  intuitive	  hunch	  that	  my	  friends	  don’t	  like	  my	  new	  partner.	  In	  neither	  of	  these	  cases	  am	  I	  a	  suitable	  object	  of	  pity	  on	  account	  of	  how	  things	  seem	  to	  me,	  however;	  in	  neither	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  I	  owe	  this	  example	  to	  Robert	  Cowan.	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of	  these	  cases	  is	  it	  true	  that	  something’s	  seeming	  bad	  to	  me	  in	  one	  way	  is	  bad	  for	  me	  in	  the	  other	  relevant	  way.5	  As	  might	  be	  obvious,	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  seeming,	  for	  the	  evaluativist’s	  purposes,	  isn’t	  belief	  or	  thought,	  intuition	  or	  construal,	  but	  an	  affective	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  phenomenal)	  seeming	  or	  perception,	  an	  affective	  (phenomenal)	  presentation	  of	  the	  relevant	  evaluative	  information.	  If	  so,	  then	  the	  evaluativist’s	  claim,	  properly	  specified,	  is	  that	  being	  in	  a	  state	  in	  which	  something	  affectively	  strikes	  you	  as	  bad	  is	  intrinsically	  bad	  for	  you.	  However,	  this	  just	  shifts	  the	  explanatory	  burden.	  For	  now	  the	  evaluativist	  must	  explain	  what	  is	  so	  special,	  i.e.,	  what	  is	  so	  bad,	  about	  the	  affective	  presentation	  of	  negative	  evaluative	  information.	  If,	  for	  instance,	  the	  suffering	  of	  grief	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  how	  a	  death	  affectively	  strikes	  one,	  then	  we	  need	  to	  know	  why	  being	  struck	  by	  this	  death	  
affectively	  is	  evaluatively	  different	  from	  being	  struck	  by	  the	  death	  non-­‐affectively.	  Or	  if,	  for	  example,	  the	  unpleasantness	  of	  pain	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  how	  some	  bodily	  disturbance	  affectively	  strikes	  one,	  then	  again	  we	  need	  to	  know	  why	  being	  struck	  affectively	  by	  this	  disturbance	  is	  evaluatively	  different	  from	  being	  struck	  by	  this	  in	  a	  non-­‐affective	  manner.	  We	  might	  legitimately	  ask:	  why	  is	  an	  affective	  mode	  or	  manner	  of	  presentation	  intrinsically	  bad,	  when	  other	  modes	  or	  manners	  of	  presentation	  of	  the	  same	  information	  are	  not?	  It	  is,	  of	  course,	  tempting	  to	  say	  that	  the	  affective	  presentation	  of	  information	  about	  the	  relevant	  events	  –	  the	  death,	  the	  bodily	  disturbance	  –	  is	  unpleasant,	  and	  that	  that’s	  what	  makes	  it	  bad;	  the	  kind	  of	  seeming	  that	  will	  make	  this	  version	  of	  evaluativism	  intuitively	  plausible	  will	  thus	  be	  an	  unpleasant	  kind	  of	  seeming,	  a	  way	  in	  which	  the	  badness	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  At	  least,	  if	  we	  understand	  ‘construal’	  and	  ‘intuition’	  in	  the	  ‘philosophical’	  sense	  as	  referring	  to	  some	  non-­‐affective	  or	  non-­‐emotional	  ‘take’	  on	  our	  situation.	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of	  some	  object	  or	  event	  impresses	  itself	  on	  you	  in	  an	  unpleasant	  affective	  manner	  or	  mode	  of	  presentation.	  But	  this	  would	  of	  course	  be	  a	  viciously	  circular	  explanation	  of	  unpleasantness.	  	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  evaluativism	  leaves	  an	  explanatory	  gap:	  the	  account	  fails	  to	  provide	  a	  non-­‐circular	  explanation	  of	  why	  it	  is	  that	  something’s	  seeming	  bad	  to	  you	  in	  an	  affective	  way	  is	  intrinsically	  bad,	  when	  other	  states	  in	  which	  things	  seem	  bad	  to	  you	  are	  not	  intrinsically	  bad.	  Without	  a	  further	  story	  as	  to	  how	  we	  might	  close	  this	  gap,	  Bain’s	  version	  of	  evaluativism	  fails	  to	  solve	  the	  messenger-­‐shooting	  objection,	  and	  as	  such	  fails	  to	  provide	  a	  satisfactory	  explanation	  of	  the	  unpleasantness	  of	  pain.	  Does	  anything	  Helm	  say	  about	  painfulness	  help	  the	  evaluativist	  out	  of	  this	  difficulty?	  It	  seems	  not.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Helm’s	  general	  take	  on	  affective	  phenomenology	  is	  as	  follows:	  “what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  feel	  emotional	  pleasure	  or	  pain	  is	  to	  have	  one’s	  attention	  gripped	  by	  the	  goodness	  or	  badness	  of	  something	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  one	  thereby	  feels	  the	  pull	  to	  act	  appropriately.”	  (Helm	  2002,	  pp.	  19-­‐20)	  So	  on	  his	  view	  what	  is	  distinctive	  about	  being	  affectively	  struck	  or	  impressed	  by	  the	  goodness	  or	  badness	  of	  some	  state	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  feeling	  of	  one’s	  attention	  being	  gripped	  and	  the	  pull	  to	  act,	  where	  such	  feelings	  are	  presumably	  absent	  when	  one	  is	  non-­‐affectively	  struck	  or	  impressed	  by	  good	  or	  bad	  things.	  But	  this	  explanation	  is	  problematic.	  For	  one	  thing,	  it	  fails	  to	  provide	  an	  explanation	  of	  unpleasantness	  as	  opposed	  to	  pleasantness.	  For	  another,	  even	  if	  Helm	  can	  avoid	  this	  objection,	  we	  might	  think	  that	  any	  such	  explanation	  of	  unpleasantness	  is	  incompatible	  with	  the	  spirit	  of	  evaluativism.	  This	  is	  because	  this	  kind	  of	  explanation	  makes	  appeal	  to	  features	  that	  distinguish	  affective	  experience	  from	  non-­‐affective	  experience	  –	  in	  this	  case,	  features	  to	  do	  with	  attentional	  capture	  and	  motivational	  pull.	  But	  then	  why	  not	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appeal	  to	  these	  features	  directly	  to	  explain	  pain’s	  badness	  and	  forego	  appeal	  to	  the	  relevant	  evaluation?	  Compare,	  for	  instance,	  an	  explanation	  of	  pain’s	  badness	  in	  terms	  of	  pain	  occupying	  costly	  attentional	  resources	  and	  distracting	  us	  from	  other,	  possibly	  more	  important	  things.	  Here	  someone	  might	  say	  that	  it	  is	  this	  negative	  cost	  that	  explains	  the	  badness	  of	  painful	  experiences.	  But	  the	  obvious	  problem	  is	  that	  any	  such	  account	  will	  be	  incompatible	  with	  the	  evaluativist’s	  main	  claim,	  namely	  that	  it	  is	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  negative	  evaluation	  that	  pain	  counts	  as	  bad	  and	  not	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  costliness	  of	  affective	  experience.	  So	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  how	  Helm	  can	  avoid	  the	  messenger-­‐shooting	  objection	  either.	  All	  is	  not	  lost	  for	  the	  evaluativist,	  however.	  In	  the	  following	  section	  I’ll	  consider	  the	  prospects	  for	  a	  form	  of	  evaluativism	  which	  holds	  that	  the	  relevant	  evaluation	  is	  of	  the	  sensation	  rather	  than	  the	  bodily	  damage.	  As	  we’ll	  see,	  this	  form	  of	  evaluativism	  would	  seem	  to	  avoid	  the	  messenger-­‐shooting	  objection,	  and	  so	  the	  view	  represents	  a	  promising	  development	  of	  the	  evaluativist	  theory.	  But	  as	  we’ll	  also	  see,	  such	  a	  view	  faces	  a	  serious	  difficulty	  of	  its	  own;	  this	  suggests	  that	  we	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  doubt	  the	  viability	  of	  evaluativism	  in	  any	  form.6	  	  	  	   3.	  	  A	  different	  kind	  of	  evaluativism	  can	  be	  developed.	  On	  this	  view,	  painful	  experiences	  consist	  of	  a	  sensation	  that	  represents	  a	  bodily	  disturbance	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  No	  card-­‐carrying	  evaluativist	  has,	  to	  my	  knowledge,	  proposed	  such	  a	  view	  –	  although	  versions	  of	  the	  desire-­‐theory	  which	  hold	  desires	  to	  be	  themselves	  forms	  of	  evaluative	  experience	  come	  close.	  For	  a	  development	  of	  this	  line,	  see	  for	  instance	  Graham	  Oddie’s	  book	  Value,	  Reality,	  and	  Desire,	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  (2005).	  But	  this	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  it	  is	  not	  worth	  exploring	  the	  possibilities	  the	  view	  offers,	  especially	  if	  it	  can	  avoid	  the	  messenger-­‐shooting	  objection.	  Indeed,	  as	  we’ll	  further	  see,	  examination	  of	  this	  form	  of	  evaluativism	  will	  ultimately	  be	  of	  great	  value	  in	  indicating	  the	  shape	  that	  a	  ‘relational’	  account	  of	  negative	  affect	  should	  take.	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malfunction	  of	  a	  certain	  sort,	  and	  a	  negative	  evaluation	  of	  this	  sensation,	  where	  this	  latter	  is	  a	  form	  of	  or	  akin	  to	  a	  perceptual	  experience.	  So	  on	  this	  kind	  of	  account,	  it	  is	  the	  sensation,	  rather	  than	  the	  bodily	  state,	  that	  we	  see	  as	  bad.	  	  This	  form	  of	  evaluativism	  would	  appear	  to	  avoid	  the	  messenger-­‐shooting	  objection,	  since	  it	  holds	  that	  it	  is	  the	  sensation,	  rather	  than	  the	  bodily	  disturbance,	  which	  is	  the	  object	  of	  the	  negative	  evaluation.	  There	  is	  thus	  indeed	  something	  distinctive	  about	  affective	  presentations	  of	  information	  about	  some	  bodily	  state,	  namely	  that	  such	  presentations	  are	  themselves	  the	  object	  of	  a	  negative	  evaluation.	  In	  this	  way	  our	  second	  form	  of	  evaluativism	  appears	  to	  explain	  what	  is	  special	  about	  affective,	  as	  opposed	  to	  non-­‐affective,	  modes	  or	  manners	  of	  presentation.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  version	  of	  evaluativism	  faces	  a	  serious	  and	  well-­‐known	  objection:	  namely,	  that	  it	  seems	  to	  get	  the	  explanatory	  story	  the	  wrong	  way	  around.	  For	  this	  form	  of	  evaluativism	  makes	  the	  badness	  of	  the	  sensation	  depend	  upon	  a	  representation	  of	  it	  as	  bad:	  it	  is	  because	  the	  sensation	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  negative	  evaluation	  that	  it	  counts	  as	  painful	  or	  unpleasant.	  But	  it	  is	  more	  natural	  and	  more	  plausible	  –	  or	  so	  many	  philosophers	  think	  –	  to	  hold	  that	  we	  represent	  the	  sensation	  as	  bad	  because	  it	  is	  bad.	  The	  painfulness	  of	  pain	  sensations	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  they	  seem	  bad	  to	  us,	  rather	  than	  our	  representing	  pain	  sensations	  as	  bad	  being	  the	  reason	  why	  pains	  are	  painful.	  	  In	  support,	  note	  that	  there	  are	  general	  worries	  about	  the	  capacity	  of	  mental	  states	  to	  confer	  value	  on	  objects	  and	  events:	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  states	  such	  as	  perception,	  belief,	  desire,	  and	  evaluation	  suggest	  that	  these	  are	  subject	  to	  external	  normative	  constraints	  or	  are	  explicable	  in	  terms	  of	  external	  normative	  goals	  such	  as	  accuracy,	  truth,	  attainability,	  or	  goodness.	  We	  might	  therefore	  resist	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  explain	  the	  relevant	  goals	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  states	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themselves.	  Moreover,	  and	  as	  Bain	  points	  out,	  if	  pain	  sensations	  were	  painful	  because	  they	  seemed	  bad	  to	  us,	  then	  our	  impressions	  or	  seemings	  would	  have	  to	  be	  ‘self-­‐verifying’	  and	  ‘incapable	  of	  incorrectness’,	  and	  this	  is	  problematic.	  (Bain	  2013,	  p.	  80)	  As	  a	  result,	  evaluativism	  falls	  foul	  of	  a	  version	  of	  the	  ‘Euthyphro	  problem’,	  and	  so	  we	  are	  no	  closer	  to	  a	  plausible	  explanation	  for	  painfulness	  on	  evaluativist	  lines.	  	  It	  seems	  to	  me,	  however,	  that	  evaluativism	  of	  this	  kind	  is	  in	  fact	  relatively	  untroubled	  by	  this	  standard	  objection:	  evaluativism	  can	  avoid	  the	  Euthyphro	  problem,	  and	  the	  associated	  charge	  that	  it	  makes	  our	  impressions	  self-­‐verifying	  or	  incapable	  of	  incorrectness.	  As	  we’ll	  see,	  however,	  this	  comes	  at	  a	  significant	  cost:	  the	  price	  to	  be	  paid	  for	  avoiding	  the	  problem	  is	  to	  open	  the	  door	  to	  other,	  more	  plausible	  relational	  accounts	  of	  painfulness.	  	  Although	  Euthyphro	  questions,	  when	  raised	  against	  ‘relational’	  accounts	  of	  painfulness	  –	  namely,	  ones	  that	  explain	  painfulness	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  a	  sensation	  and	  an	  additional	  element,	  such	  as	  an	  evaluation	  or	  a	  desire	  –	  can	  seem	  devastating,	  this	  impression	  can	  disappear	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  questions	  more	  closely.	  Consider	  Bain’s	  version	  of	  the	  question:	  “Is	  it	  the	  case	  (i)	  that	  your	  pain	  is	  represented	  as	  bad	  because	  it	  is	  bad,	  or	  (ii)	  that	  your	  pain	  is	  bad	  because	  it	  is	  represented	  as	  bad?”	  (Ibid.)	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  many	  people	  think	  that	  the	  most	  natural	  and	  most	  plausible	  answer	  here	  is	  (i).	  But	  is	  this	  answer	  really	  more	  plausible?	  One	  reason	  for	  scepticism	  here	  is	  that	  in	  many	  cases	  things	  are	  represented	  to	  us	  as	  thus-­‐and-­‐so	  but	  not	  because	  things	  are	  thus-­‐and-­‐so.	  The	  obvious	  case	  here	  is	  that	  of	  inaccurate	  or	  misrepresentation.	  Suppose	  I	  have	  a	  perceptual	  experience	  of	  an	  Irish	  red	  setter	  but	  in	  poor	  lighting	  conditions:	  it	  is	  dusk,	  and	  the	  red	  setter	  appears	  to	  be	  grey.	  Here	  the	  best	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explanation	  for	  my	  representing	  the	  red	  setter	  as	  grey	  won’t	  invoke	  its	  being	  grey,	  since	  it	  isn’t	  true	  that	  it	  is	  grey.	  Or	  suppose,	  as	  a	  nervous	  type,	  I	  am	  afraid	  of	  monarch	  butterflies,	  and	  so	  I	  have	  an	  emotional	  experience	  of	  a	  monarch	  butterfly	  as	  dangerous.	  But	  here	  too	  the	  best	  explanation	  for	  my	  representing	  the	  butterfly	  as	  dangerous	  won’t	  invoke	  its	  dangerousness,	  given	  that	  it	  is	  harmless.	  In	  both	  of	  these	  cases	  I	  represent	  things	  as	  I	  do	  in	  part	  because	  of	  certain	  features	  of	  the	  (perceived)	  object	  in	  question,	  and	  because	  of	  certain	  facts	  about	  lighting	  conditions,	  or	  an	  encounter	  with	  a	  swarm	  of	  monarch	  butterflies	  when	  I	  was	  a	  child,	  etc.	  What	  the	  explanations	  don’t	  involve	  is	  an	  appeal	  to	  the	  real	  existence	  of	  the	  feature	  that	  I	  represent	  the	  object	  as	  having.	  Now	  I	  take	  it	  that	  there	  are	  no	  Euthyphro-­‐type	  dilemmas	  in	  the	  offing	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  misperceiving	  colours	  or	  recalcitrant	  emotions:	  it’s	  not	  the	  case	  that	  I	  represent	  the	  dog	  as	  grey	  because	  it’s	  grey,	  nor	  the	  case	  that	  the	  dog	  is	  grey	  because	  I	  represent	  it	  as	  grey.	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  it’s	  not	  the	  case	  that	  I	  represent	  monarch	  butterflies	  as	  dangerous	  because	  they	  are	  dangerous,	  nor	  the	  case	  that	  they	  are	  dangerous	  because	  I	  represent	  them	  as	  so.	  Neither	  answer	  is	  correct	  in	  these	  cases.	   Consider	  now	  a	  similar	  point	  with	  respect	  to	  pain.	  Suppose	  a	  subject	  is	  experiencing	  phantom	  limb	  pain.	  According	  to	  the	  form	  of	  evaluativism	  discussed	  in	  §2,	  this	  will	  involve	  her	  representing	  some	  bodily	  disturbance	  as	  bad.	  But	  again,	  the	  explanation	  of	  her	  representing	  this	  as	  bad	  will	  not	  invoke	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  badness	  of	  the	  bodily	  disturbance,	  because	  there	  is	  no	  bodily	  disturbance.	  So	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistaken	  explanation	  of	  the	  state’s	  seeming	  bad	  to	  our	  subject	  to	  invoke	  that	  state’s	  actually	  being	  bad.	  And	  once	  again,	  we	  should	  be	  equally	  disinclined	  to	  maintain	  that	  the	  bodily	  disturbance	  is	  bad	  because	  our	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subject	  has	  an	  impression	  that	  it	  is	  bad.	  For	  there	  is	  no	  disturbance	  in	  her	  missing	  limb,	  and	  hence	  nothing	  bad	  going	  on	  in	  that	  missing	  limb.	  So	  to	  the	  question	  “Is	  it	  the	  case	  (i)	  that	  some	  bodily	  disturbance	  is	  represented	  as	  bad	  because	  it	  is	  bad,	  or	  (ii)	  that	  the	  bodily	  disturbance	  is	  bad	  because	  it	  is	  represented	  as	  bad?”,	  the	  correct	  answer	  in	  this	  case	  is	  again	  “neither.”	  	  But	  how	  will	  this	  help	  evaluativism	  of	  the	  second	  kind?	  Well,	  the	  fact	  that	  Euthyphro	  questions	  are	  not	  always	  appropriate	  with	  respect	  to	  our	  evaluative	  representations	  raises	  the	  possibility	  that	  they	  are	  not	  appropriate	  with	  respect	  to	  our	  appraisals	  of	  our	  sensations.	  That	  is,	  if	  there	  are	  reasons	  to	  be	  suspicious	  about	  the	  general	  claim	  that	  something’s	  seeming	  a	  certain	  way	  evaluatively	  must	  either	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  being	  that	  way	  evaluatively	  or	  must	  be	  capable	  of	  conferring	  value	  on	  to	  that	  something,	  then	  we	  can	  cast	  doubt	  upon	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  most	  plausible	  explanation	  of	  some	  sensation	  of	  bodily	  disturbance	  seeming	  bad	  to	  a	  subject	  must	  invoke	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  sensation	  really	  is	  bad,	  whilst	  avoiding	  a	  commitment	  to	  an	  implausible	  form	  of	  subjectivism.	  Now	  to	  make	  this	  work,	  of	  course,	  the	  evaluativist	  will	  have	  to	  provide	  the	  relevant	  explanatory	  details:	  the	  claim	  that	  Euthyphro	  questions	  don’t	  work	  with	  respect	  to	  phantom	  limb	  pain	  and	  recalcitrant	  emotions	  is	  only	  plausible	  because	  we	  have	  other	  and	  plausible	  explanatory	  options	  in	  these	  cases.	  The	  evaluativist	  will	  have	  to	  provide	  something	  similar:	  namely,	  a	  (more)	  plausible	  explanatory	  option	  than	  those	  offered	  by	  the	  Euthyphro	  questions,	  and	  thus	  an	  explanatory	  option	  that	  involves	  neither	  an	  appeal	  to	  the	  badness	  of	  the	  affective	  representation,	  or	  a	  commitment	  to	  an	  implausible	  form	  of	  subjectivism.	  Luckily	  for	  the	  evaluativist,	  there	  is	  another	  option	  to	  hand.	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The	  important	  thing	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  is	  that	  evaluativism	  is	  a	  relational	  account	  of	  painfulness.	  All	  such	  relational	  accounts	  explain	  the	  badness	  or	  painfulness	  of	  pain	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  sensation	  and	  some	  other	  component:	  a	  desire	  that	  the	  sensation	  cease,	  an	  imperative	  that	  we	  act	  so	  as	  to	  reduce	  the	  sensation,	  a	  negative	  evaluation	  of	  the	  sensation,	  and	  so	  on.	  If	  so,	  however,	  then	  strictly	  speaking	  those	  who	  support	  relational	  theories	  should	  deny	  that	  it	  is	  the	  
sensation	  that	  is	  painful	  or	  bad.	  They	  should,	  instead,	  maintain	  that	  what	  is	  painful	  or	  what	  is	  bad	  is	  the	  sensation	  plus	  the	  other	  component	  (desire,	  imperative,	  evaluation).	  It	  is	  thus	  the	  whole	  experience	  consisting	  of	  a	  sensation	  
and	  some	  desire	  or	  imperative	  or	  evaluation	  that	  is	  the	  bearer	  of	  the	  evaluative	  property,	  and	  that	  has	  normative	  and	  motivational	  force.	  If	  so,	  however,	  then	  evaluativism	  can	  provide	  a	  plausible	  explanation	  of	  why	  Euthyphro	  questions	  are	  not	  appropriately	  applied	  to	  her	  account	  of	  painfulness.	  Since	  it	  is	  the	  compound	  experience	  of	  the	  sensation	  plus	  negative	  assessment	  of	  this	  sensation	  that	  is	  painful	  or	  bad,	  it	  is	  false	  that	  we	  negatively	  evaluate	  the	  sensation	  as	  bad	  because	  the	  sensation	  is	  bad.	  For	  the	  sensation,	  by	  itself,	  is	  not	  bad.	  And	  since	  it	  is	  the	  compound	  experience	  of	  sensation	  plus	  evaluation	  that	  is	  painful	  and	  hence	  bad,	  it	  is	  false	  that	  the	  evaluation	  of	  the	  sensation	  makes	  this	  sensation	  bad.	  For	  again,	  the	  sensation,	  by	  itself,	  is	  not	  bad.	  So	  this	  form	  of	  evaluativism	  doesn’t	  succumb	  to	  the	  Euthyphro	  problem.	  We	  can,	  moreover,	  see	  why	  evaluativism	  isn’t	  committed	  to	  holding	  that	  the	  relevant	  appraisals	  are	  self-­‐verifying	  or	  incapable	  of	  incorrectness.	  For	  if	  the	  above	  is	  correct,	  our	  evaluations	  of	  the	  badness	  of	  the	  sensation	  are	  all	  mistaken.	  Far	  from	  being	  self-­‐verifying,	  our	  evaluations	  all	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  wrong.	  The	  fact	  that	  evaluativism	  is	  a	  relational	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theory	  thus	  prevents	  it	  from	  being	  committed	  to	  an	  implausible	  form	  of	  subjectivism	  about	  value.	  Evaluativism	  can,	  therefore,	  escape	  the	  standard	  Euthyphro	  objection	  to	  relational	  accounts.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  evaluativism	  manages	  to	  do	  so	  raises	  another	  worry	  that	  casts	  serious	  doubt	  upon	  the	  theory;	  and	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  how	  evaluativism	  can	  avoid	  this	  problem.	  To	  see	  this,	  note	  again	  that	  for	  the	  evaluativist,	  what	  is	  bad	  or	  painful	  is	  not	  the	  pain	  sensation	  itself,	  but	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  pain	  sensation	  and	  a	  mistaken	  evaluation	  of	  this	  sensation	  as	  bad.	  So	  on	  this	  view	  what	  is	  bad	  is	  having	  a	  sensation	  that	  you	  wrongly	  see	  as	  bad.	  But	  this	  makes	  it	  seem	  as	  though	  the	  badness	  of	  painful	  experiences	  is	  
epistemic:	  painful	  experiences	  are	  bad	  because	  they	  involve	  a	  mistaken	  evaluation.	  For	  suppose	  we	  ask:	  what’s	  bad	  about	  an	  experience	  in	  which	  one	  wrongly	  sees	  some	  sensation	  as	  bad?	  The	  obvious	  answer	  is	  that	  this	  involves	  an	  inaccurate	  representation.	  And	  this,	  we	  might	  think,	  fails	  to	  capture	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  badness	  involved	  in	  painful	  experiences.	  	  The	  account,	  relatedly,	  fails	  to	  adequately	  capture	  the	  normativity	  of	  painfulness.	  For	  if	  the	  badness	  of	  pain	  is,	  ultimately,	  epistemic,	  then	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  we	  are	  making	  some	  kind	  of	  normative	  error	  when	  we	  are	  motivated	  by	  a	  painful	  experience	  to	  do	  what	  we	  can	  to	  make	  the	  sensation	  cease	  –	  rather	  than,	  say,	  stopping	  seeing	  the	  sensation	  as	  bad.	  The	  thought	  that	  painful	  experiences	  generate	  practical	  reasons	  therefore	  sits	  uneasily	  with	  the	  evaluativist’s	  explanation	  of	  the	  badness	  of	  such	  experiences.	  And	  if	  a	  theory	  of	  painfulness	  cannot	  easily	  explain	  the	  platitude	  that	  painful	  experiences	  give	  us	  (defeasible)	  reasons	  to	  act,	  this	  might	  be	  regarded	  as	  sufficient	  to	  reject	  that	  theory.	  If	  so,	  then	  our	  second	  form	  of	  evaluativism	  fares	  no	  better	  than	  our	  first.	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   4.	  	  To	  this	  point	  the	  paper	  has	  been	  negative:	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  both	  forms	  of	  evaluativism	  face	  serious	  difficulties	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  explaining	  the	  painfulness	  of	  pain,	  and	  to	  this	  extent	  ought	  to	  be	  rejected.	  If	  these	  arguments	  work,	  then	  we	  can	  be	  equally	  doubtful	  about	  the	  capacity	  of	  evaluativism	  –	  of	  any	  stripe	  –	  to	  explain	  unpleasantness	  or	  the	  badness	  of	  negative	  affect	  in	  general.	  The	  hedonic	  element	  common	  to	  guilt,	  shame,	  disappointment,	  and	  grief	  is	  not	  therefore	  to	  be	  explained	  by	  appeal	  to	  the	  negative	  evaluations	  that	  these	  emotions	  involve.	  In	  the	  space	  that	  remains	  I’ll	  explain,	  briefly,	  how	  relational	  accounts	  of	  painfulness	  and	  negative	  affect	  might	  be	  developed	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  these	  criticisms.	  Our	  discussion	  of	  the	  difficulties	  faced	  by	  evaluativist	  accounts	  of	  both	  kinds	  can	  thus	  prove	  helpful	  in	  illustrating	  the	  shape	  that	  a	  relational	  account	  should	  take.	  	  	  We	  saw	  in	  §3	  that	  evaluativism	  makes	  the	  badness	  of	  pain	  an	  epistemic	  affair.	  A	  more	  plausible	  relational	  account	  should	  therefore	  appeal	  to	  an	  element	  that	  isn’t	  capable	  of	  misrepresentation.	  An	  obvious	  candidate,	  and	  one	  which	  is	  familiar	  from	  the	  pain	  literature,	  is	  the	  element	  of	  dislike.7	  On	  this	  view,	  unpleasant	  experiences	  in	  general	  are	  constituted	  by	  bodily	  sensations	  that	  we	  dislike.	  For	  example,	  painful	  experiences	  are	  constituted	  by	  pain	  sensations	  that	  we	  dislike;	  unpleasant	  experiences	  of	  hunger	  are	  constituted	  by	  hunger	  sensations	  that	  we	  dislike;	  itches	  are	  constituted	  by	  feelings	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  A	  number	  of	  theorists	  have	  maintained	  that	  the	  unpleasantness	  of	  pain	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  a	  subject’s	  disliking	  a	  sensation	  of	  bodily	  disturbance.	  These	  include	  Armstrong	  (1962),	  Hall	  (1989),	  Pitcher	  (1970),	  and	  Tye	  in	  his	  earlier	  work	  (1995).	  But	  none	  argue	  that	  the	  dislike	  view	  ought	  to	  be	  accepted	  because,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  it	  avoids	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  evaluativist	  accounts.	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skin	  that	  we	  dislike;	  and	  so	  on.	  Since	  it	  is	  the	  compound	  which	  is,	  strictly	  speaking,	  bad,	  this	  version	  of	  the	  relational	  theory	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  Euthyphro	  problem.	  For	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  (to	  focus	  once	  more	  on	  pain)	  that	  a	  subject	  dislikes	  the	  pain	  sensation	  because	  the	  sensation	  is	  bad,	  nor	  the	  case	  that	  
the	  pain	  sensation	  is	  bad	  because	  the	  subject	  dislikes	  it.	  Instead,	  what	  is	  bad	  is	  the	  experience	  of	  having	  a	  pain	  sensation	  that	  one	  dislikes.	  Moreover,	  since	  dislike	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  being	  mistaken	  or	  inaccurate	  –	  we	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  criticism	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  disliking	  some	  sensation,	  or	  liable	  to	  the	  charge	  that	  we	  are	  getting	  something	  wrong	  –	  then	  the	  dislike	  account	  isn’t	  faced	  with	  the	  charge	  that	  it	  thereby	  makes	  the	  badness	  of	  painful	  experiences	  a	  purely	  epistemic	  matter.	  What	  is	  bad	  is	  experiencing	  a	  sensation	  we	  dislike,	  rather	  than	  experiencing	  a	  sensation	  that	  we	  mistakenly	  think	  is	  bad.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  dislike	  view	  can	  avoid	  the	  Euthyphro	  problem	  but	  in	  a	  way	  that	  doesn’t	  leave	  it	  open	  to	  the	  criticisms	  in	  the	  last	  section	  that	  undermine	  evaluativism.	  	  Still,	  it	  might	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  objections	  raised	  against	  evaluativism	  remains,	  and	  that	  the	  dislike	  view	  is	  subject	  to	  versions	  of	  the	  criticisms	  above.	  For	  instance,	  although	  dislike	  cannot	  be	  mistaken	  or	  erroneous	  in	  the	  way	  that	  a	  perceptual	  experience	  of	  the	  sensation	  as	  bad	  would	  be,	  we	  might	  nevertheless	  question	  the	  capacity	  of	  dislike	  to	  supply	  normative	  and	  motivating	  reasons,	  and	  hence	  question	  the	  capacity	  of	  dislike	  to	  capture	  the	  normative	  and	  motivating	  status	  that	  painfulness	  is	  supposed	  to	  have.	  For	  if	  we	  dislike	  some	  sensation	  but	  not	  because	  the	  sensation	  is	  in	  some	  way	  bad,	  in	  what	  sense	  is	  our	  dislike	  a	  rational	  or	  an	  appropriate	  response	  to	  the	  sensation?	  And	  if	  dislike	  is	  not	  rational	  or	  appropriate,	  then	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  we	  can	  have	  genuine	  normative	  reason	  to	  rid	  ourselves	  of	  sensations	  that	  we	  dislike.	  Ought	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we	  not,	  instead,	  to	  stop	  disliking	  them?	  Mere	  dislikes,	  like	  mere	  desires,	  seem	  to	  lack	  the	  normative	  status	  to	  generate	  genuine	  normative	  reasons	  to	  act,	  or	  to	  give	  me	  good	  reason	  to	  do	  anything.	  	  When	  applied	  to	  dislike,	  however,	  this	  criticism	  is	  unconvincing,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  rests	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  states	  that	  are	  not	  themselves	  rational	  or	  appropriate	  cannot	  generate	  normative	  reasons.	  And	  this	  is	  an	  assumption	  that	  we	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  reject.	  Think,	  to	  illustrate,	  of	  gustatory	  dislikes.	  Suppose	  I	  dislike	  the	  taste	  of	  aubergine.	  This	  is,	  clearly,	  not	  something	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  I	  am	  subject	  to	  rational	  criticism:	  my	  dislike	  is	  neither	  rational	  nor	  irrational,	  neither	  appropriate	  nor	  inappropriate.	  For	  there	  is	  nothing	  
intrinsically	  bad	  about	  how	  aubergine	  tastes.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  equally	  clear	  that	  I	  have	  good	  reason	  not	  to	  eat	  aubergine	  precisely	  because	  I	  dislike	  how	  it	  tastes.	  Dislike	  can	  therefore	  have	  the	  kind	  of	  normative	  status	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  generating	  normative	  reasons,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  not	  itself	  a	  response	  to	  reasons.	  And	  it	  shouldn’t	  be	  thought	  that	  there	  is	  something	  strange	  or	  mysterious	  about	  a	  state	  that	  is	  not	  responsive	  to	  reasons	  and	  yet	  can	  provide	  reasons.	  Consider	  ordinary	  everyday	  perceptual	  experiences:	  these	  are	  not	  responses	  to	  reasons,	  not	  rationally	  appropriate	  or	  inappropriate,	  but	  nevertheless	  provide	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  things	  are	  thus-­‐and-­‐so.	  So	  there	  are	  paradigm	  cases	  of	  states	  that	  can	  supply	  reasons	  without	  being	  reason-­‐responsive;	  and	  there	  are	  clear	  cases	  where	  dislike	  of	  some	  state	  gives	  us	  good	  reason	  to	  avoid	  being	  in	  that	  state.	  Taken	  together,	  these	  points	  provide	  good	  support	  for	  the	  view	  that	  a	  relational	  account	  of	  painfulness	  which	  appeals	  to	  dislike	  can	  both	  avoid	  the	  criticisms	  that	  undermine	  evaluativism,	  and	  capture	  the	  normative	  and	  motivational	  aspects	  that	  painful	  experiences	  are	  supposed	  to	  have.	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Of	  course,	  much	  more	  work	  would	  need	  to	  be	  done	  before	  any	  such	  account	  is	  ultimately	  plausible.	  Even	  if	  this	  kind	  of	  relational	  account	  can	  avoid	  standard	  criticisms	  based	  upon	  Euthyphro	  questions,	  and	  avoids	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  evaluativism	  of	  either	  stripe,	  a	  story	  would	  need	  to	  be	  told	  about	  how	  disliking	  pain	  sensations	  that	  are	  not	  intrinsically	  bad	  can	  nevertheless	  make	  sense	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  our	  reasons	  and	  motives.	  This	  will	  be	  a	  story	  that	  explains	  the	  point	  of	  our	  pain	  system	  operating	  as	  it	  does	  –	  by	  getting	  us	  to	  avoid	  bodily	  damage	  via	  getting	  us	  to	  act	  so	  that	  sensations	  that	  we	  dislike	  cease	  –	  rather	  than	  more	  directly.	  This	  will,	  as	  such,	  be	  a	  story	  that	  explains	  why	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  for	  us	  to	  dislike	  pain	  sensations,	  even	  though	  the	  reasons	  are	  not	  provided	  by	  the	  intrinsic	  disvalue	  of	  such	  sensations.	  I	  think	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  explanation	  is	  possible:	  for	  there	  are	  motivational	  advantages,	  in	  terms	  of	  speed	  of	  response	  and	  stability	  of	  the	  state	  in	  question,	  of	  a	  pain	  system	  that	  operates	  
via	  dislike	  of	  pain	  sensations.	  At	  least,	  such	  a	  system	  has	  advantages	  when	  compared	  with	  a	  system	  operating	  with	  more	  cognitively	  sophisticated,	  reason-­‐responsive	  mental	  states.	  This	  suggests	  that	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  for	  a	  pain	  system	  to	  operate	  with	  states	  of	  dislike	  because	  these	  states	  are	  not	  responses	  to	  reasons	  or	  values	  provided	  by	  sensations	  themselves.	  But	  this	  will,	  unfortunately,	  have	  to	  be	  a	  story	  for	  another	  occasion.8	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  An	  earlier	  version	  of	  this	  paper	  was	  presented	  at	  the	  conference	  on	  ‘Emotion	  and	  Perception’	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Tübingen	  in	  November	  2012.	  I’d	  like	  to	  thank	  Sabine	  Döring,	  Anika	  Lutz,	  Tim	  Crane,	  Michael	  Lacewing,	  Cain	  Todd,	  Peter	  Railton,	  Julien	  Deonna,	  Fabrice	  Teroni,	  and	  two	  anonymous	  referees	  for	  this	  Journal	  for	  their	  very	  helpful	  comments.	  Particular	  thanks	  are	  due	  to	  David	  Bain	  and	  Jennifer	  Corns	  for	  stimulating	  discussion	  of	  these	  issues	  in	  Glasgow.	  The	  paper	  was	  written	  while	  I	  was	  Principal	  Investigator	  of	  the	  Pain	  Project	  (University	  of	  Glasgow),	  funded	  by	  Sam	  Newlands	  and	  Mike	  Rea's	  Problem	  of	  Evil	  in	  Modern	  and	  Contemporary	  Thought	  project	  (University	  of	  Notre	  Dame),	  funded	  by	  the	  John	  Templeton	  Foundation.	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